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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to study the theory of secular stagnation, which was made famous
by the American Keynesian economist Alvin Hansen in his book Full Recovery or Stagnation.
The theory of secular stagnation has reappeared in economic circles today due to recent
economic conditions since the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The thesis will analyze the history
of the stagnation theory dating back to Classical economists in the 19th century. The concept of a
stagnating economy has been talked about for centuries with many economists adding important
thoughts. Furthermore, the thesis will address the current questions and examine whether the
stagnation claims have merit in today’s economy. High unemployment and slow economic
growth in developed countries including the United States may be explained by the theories of
secular stagnation and the matured economy.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Recently, there has been a renewed discussion on the idea of secular stagnation. The
recovery from the great recession of 2008 has seen the economy experience low growth and a slow
decline in unemployment. Secular stagnation, a term introduced to us by Alvin Hansen, an
American economist is the idea that the economy has stagnated due to structural changes and is
not just a normal downturn in a business cycle.
In 2013, former Treasury Secretary and former National Economic Council director
Lawrence Summers made a case that the United States could be facing secular stagnation at an
International Monetary Fund conference. Since then, there has been plenty of discussion on the
theory. Summers has gone back and forth with former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben
Bernanke on the validity of the theory in today’s world.
The idea of a stagnating economy is not new. It dates back to Classical economists of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century. A theory of population introduced by Thomas Malthus served
as a basis for stagnation theories from various economists of the Classical era. Karl Marx also
developed a theory of stagnation as well, expanding on the ideas from Classical economists. Next,
Thorstein Veblen developed his own stagnation theory. Lastly, we get to Keynes and Alvin
Hansen who developed the most advanced theory of stagnation.
In this thesis, we will examine the evolution of the various stagnation theories and look to
the writings of these prominent economists to explain each school of thought’s theory. Also, we
will examine any solutions that each economist proposed as a way to avoid stagnation in a capitalist
economy.
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Chapter two will be devoted to the study of the Classical school and their views on
capitalistic stagnation. First, we will explain the Malthusian theory of population to provide a
basis for the Classical school of thought. Then, we can continue to examine the theories of John
Stuart Mill and David Ricardo. In Chapter three, we examine Marx’s outlook on the future of
capitalistic society and his theory of stagnation.

Chapter four will introduce Institutional

economics and the writings and ideas of Thorstein Veblen. We will analyze his thoughts on
stagnation. Chapter five deals with John Maynard Keynes and how his analysis of the economy
has an underlying idea of stagnation. In Chapter six, we get to the idea of secular stagnation and
the matured economy. Alvin Hansen contributed a lot to these ideas which are still important
today. Chapter seven dissects the debate today between Lawrence Summers, Ben Bernanke, and
others. And finally in Chapter eight, we have concluding remarks.
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Chapter Two: Classical Economists on Stagnation
The early theories of stagnation put forward by Classical economists were, by a large
extent, based on Thomas Malthus’ argument in An Essay on the Principles of Population. So, we
will first analyze these principles before presenting the stagnation theories of David Ricardo and
John Stuart Mill.
The Malthusian theory of population states that the means of subsistence limits the
population of the earth and that the food supply will increase in an arithmetical ratio, while the
population will increase in a geometrical manner (Malthus I, 1933, pp. 8-10). Therefore, the food
supply would not be able to keep up with population growth over the long term. Malthus revised
his theory of population in the second edition, but some economists failed to address this in their
economic writings. In later editions of the Principles of Population, he denied that the ‘Law of
Diminishing Returns’ would lead civilization to a gloomy end. Instead, he proposed that man may
take precautions to prevent this end of society (Malthus I, 1933, pp. 341).
Malthus would go on to explain, in the first edition, his opinion on the growth of population
and the food supply with:
The necessary effects of these two different ratios of increase, when brought
together, will be very striking. Let us call the population of this island 11,000,000; and
suppose the present produce equal to the support of such a number. In the first twenty-five
years the population would be 22,000,000, and the food being doubled, the means of
subsistence would be equal to the increase. In the next twenty-five years, the population
would be 44,000,000, and the means of subsistence only equal to the support of 33,000,000.
In the next period the population would be 88,000,000, and the means of subsistence just
equal to the support of one-half that number. And, at the conclusion of the first century,
the population would be 176,000,000 and the means of subsistence only equal to the
support of 55,000,000, leaving the population of 12,000,000 totally unprovided for
(Malthus II, 1933, pp. 126-127).
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Up until the publication of Malthus’ An Essay on the Principles of Population, political
economy had upheld the optimistic outlook that Adam Smith had introduced in The Wealth of
Nations. Adam Smith insisted “every increase in the stock or revenue of society as increase in the
funds for the maintenance of labor” (Malthus, 1933, pp. 128-129), but Malthus rejected this idea
and held “that the funds for the maintenance of labor do not necessarily increase with the increase
of wealth, and very rarely increase in proportion to it” (Malthus, 1933, p. 129).
The Malthusian theory of population began to catch on with political economists and
industrialists. E.A.J Johnson described this fascination clearly in his book Some Origins of the
Modern Economic World:
The Malthusian theory of population fell like Mana from Heaven into the hands of
English capitalists. Here was a convenient explanation of poverty and low-wages, a body
of social theory supported by an imposing parade of facts which proved the universality of
a ‘Natural’ principle of population. Here then was a philosophical fount in which factory
owners could wash their unclean hands. Low wages had their origin in the ‘passion
between the sexes’ which resulted in a natural tendency for population to outstrip the food
supply. For these conditions surely the employer of labor could not be held responsible;
in fact, he was rather a social benefactor who have employment to a large number of those
super-poor. The real culprits were the parents who, by failing to curb their reproductive
propensities, had brought into existence these unfortunate children whom factories
employed (Johnson, 1938, pp. 108-109).

The Malthusian theory of population laid the foundation for the Classical School’s
stagnation theory. Classical Economists such as David Ricardo and Alfred Marshall have held
that production is limited by ‘The Law of Supply and Demand’ and ‘The Law of Diminishing
Returns.’ The Malthusian theory of population reveals the ‘The Law of Diminishing Returns’, as
it states that as additional amounts of capital or labor are added to production past an optimum
point the profits to be gained will be less and less with each addition of capital or labor (McConnell,
1947, p. 121).
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Now that we have explained some of the ideas presented in Malthus’ An Essay on the
Principles of Population, we can now understand the Classical School’s theory of stagnation better.
More specifically, we will examine the views of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill.
David Ricardo’s Stagnation Theory
Classical economist David Ricardo develops his theory of stagnation in his Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation. He develops the stagnation theory that was underlying in the
works of Malthus and his predecessors. Through Ricardo’s theory of rent and his examination of
the tendency of profits to fall in manufacturing, his stagnation theory is given life.
In his theory of differential fertility of land, Ricardo accepts Malthus’ establishment of
‘The Law of Diminishing Returns’. This creation of the differential fertility of land leads to one
of Ricardo’s arguments that the economy of a capitalistic society will end in stagnation. John W.
McConnell describes Ricardo’s idea of rent:
Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of
the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers
of the soil. There is no rent when land of nearly equal fertility is present in sufficient
abundance to supply human demands. When an increase in population causes land of
inferior quality and less advantageous situation to be called into cultivation, then rent is
paid. Assuming the presence of land of three degrees of quality, let us suppose an increase
in population creates a demand for food, making it necessary to call into cultivation the
land of the second quality. The greater the costs of production, either in labor or
transportation, will cause the price to rise. Obviously, the smaller costs of production on
the first quality land in relation to the price paid for each unit of the product will yield a
surplus to the first land over the second. This, says Ricardo, is rent. If further increase in
population brings the land of the third quality into production, rent on both first and second
quality land will rise. The price of natural products will be determined by the higher labor
costs necessary to produce the additional quantities needed under the least favorable
circumstances (McConnell, 1947, pp. 55-56).

Ricardo showed that differential rents on land of several qualities tended to drive down
profits. If the falling rate of profit of a farmer merely hurt him, it would not force the economy
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into stagnation; however, “there are few commodities which are not more or less affected in their
price by the rise of raw produce, because some raw material from the land enters into the
composition of most commodities” (Ricardo, 2001, p. 90).
Ricardo said the natural rates of profits is to fall based on his examination of “The Law of
Diminishing Returns’ and his theory of the differential fertility of land. He summarized:
The natural tendency of profits, then is to fall; for, in the progress of society and wealth,
the additional quantity of food required is obtained by the sacrifice of more and more labor.
This tendency, this gravitation as it were of profits, is happily checked at repeated intervals
by the improvements in machinery connected with the production of necessities, as well as
by the discoveries in the sciences, which enables us to relinquish a portion of labor before
required, and therefore to lower the price of the prime necessities of the laborer. The rise
of labor is, however, limited; for as soon as wages should be equal to 720 pounds, the
whole receipts of the farmer, there must be an end to accumulation, for no capital can yield
any profit whatever, and no additional labor can be demanded and consequently population
will have reached its highest point (Ricardo, 2001, pp. 96-99).

Ricardo contended that without improved technology the economy would end in stagnation
because of the difference in profits to be derived from lands of differing qualities. He also later
argues in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation that increased technology will only prevent
stagnation for a brief period of time. Ricardo was of the opinion that the discrepancy between
fixed and circulating capital would drive the economy into stagnation, this despite improvements
were made in the state of industrial arts:
Were it true that the proportion between these two sorts of capital is the same at all times,
and in all countries, then indeed, it follows that the number of laborers employed is in
proportion to the wealth of the state. But such a proposition has not the semblance of
probability. As arts are cultivated, and civilization is extended, fixed capital bears a larger
and larger proportion to circulating capital. The amount of fixed capital employed in the
production of a piece of British muslin is at least a hundred times, probably a thousand
times greater than that employed in the production of a similar piece of Indian muslin. And
the proportion of circulating capital is a thousand times less. It is easy to conceive that
under certain circumstances, the whole of the annual savings of an industrious people might
be added to fixed capital, in which case they would have no effect in increasing the demand
for labor (Ricardo, 2001, pp. 385-387).
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With his acceptance of the Malthusian law of population and the differential theory of rent,
and his theory of the downward trend of profits due to the discrepancy between fixed and
circulating capital, Ricardo described a very bleak future of the capitalistic society. Eric Roll
summarizes Ricardo’s views compared with other Classical economists in his History of Economic
Thought:
It has been the fashion in recent years to regard Ricardo’s work as the most distinct
exposition of the beliefs contained in the classical theory that the economic system
automatically achieved full employment and market equilibrium through time, and that
fluctuations of economic activity or prolonged stagnation were impossible. Closer
examination reveals, however, that Ricardo’s analysis, because it penetrated to greater
depths than did that of his contemporaries, was by far the least polished statement of these
classical beliefs. It left open many problems to which subsequent theories of crises and
under-employment could be attached. Many theories of technological unemployment or
of disproportions in the structure of production can be traced back to the views enunciated
by Ricardo. And the Marxian theory of crises, too, has a close connection with Ricardo’s
theory of economic development (Roll, 1942, pp. 204-205).

We will later look at the Marxian theory of stagnation but now we will examine the
stagnation theory of John Stuart Mill.
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John Stuart Mill’s Stagnation Theory
Next, we will examine the works of John Stuart Mill in an attempt to discover his thoughts
on the prospect of a stagnating economy. Mill’s theory of stagnation also grows out of the
Malthusian theory of population growth and he also thought the loss of savings would drive the
economy into stagnation as Classical economists believed all funds for investment must be derived
from the savings of the community. The modern-day concept of banks creating money through
loans was not a practiced (McConnell, 1947, pp. 150-160).
The capacity of increase is necessarily in a geometrical ratio; the numerical ratio is
different.
To this property of organized beings, the human species forms no exception. Its power of
increase is indefinite, and the actual multiplication would be extraordinarily rapid, if the
power were exercised to the utmost. It is never exercised to the utmost and yet, in the most
favorable circumstances known to exist, which are those of a fertile region colonized from
an industrious and civilized community, population has continued, for several generations,
independently of fresh immigration, to double itself in not much more than twenty-five
years (Mill, 1965, pp. 153-155).

Besides the Malthusian law of population growth, Mill also believed that the ‘Law of
Diminishing Returns’ would also ultimately lead to a stationary state. He wrote in his Principles
of Political Economy:
Though the general thriftiness of the laboring class is much below what is desirable, the
spirit of accumulation in the most prosperous part of the community requires abatement
rather than an increase. In these countries there would never be any difficulty of capital, if
its increase were never checked or brought to a stand by too great diminution of its returns.
It is the tendency of the returns to a progressive diminution, which causes the increase of
production to be often attended with a deterioration in the conditions of the producers; and
this tendency, which would in time put an end to increase of production altogether; is a
result of the necessary and inherent condition of the production from the land (Mill, 1965,
pp. 187-88).

9

Despite there being a plethora of capital and technical knowledge at the time, Mill still held
a pessimistic outlook of the future due to his belief in the ‘Law of Diminishing Returns’.
When a country has long possessed a large production, and a large net income to make
savings from and when, therefore, the means have long existed of making a great annual
addition to capital; it is one of the characteristics of such a country that the rate of profit is
habitually within as it were, a hand’s breadth of the minimum, and the country therefore
on the very verge of the stationary state (Mill, 1965, p. 446).

According to Mill, the only way to cure stagnation would be to cut the wages of the laborer
or to force into the labor market those persons not engaged in productive labor. However, Mill’s
suggestions were not seriously believed by himself or his followers.
On the whole, therefore, we may assume that in such a country as England, if the present
amount in such a country as England, if the present amount of savings were to continue,
without any of the counteracting circumstances which now keep in check the natural
influence of those savings in reducing the profits, the rate of profit would speedily attain
the minimum, and all further accumulation of capital would for the present case (Mill,
1965, p. 448).

When Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations in 1776, he created an optimistic
spirit of capitalism. But within less than one hundred years, we find John Stuart Mill, a follower
of Smith having a much more pessimistic view due to his view of the tendency of profits to fall
and the ‘Law of Diminishing Returns’. Mill summarized his negative view:
This impossibility of ultimately avoiding the stationary state – this irresistible necessity
that the stream of human industry should finally spread itself out into an apparently
stagnant sea – must have been, to the political economists of the last two generations, an
unpleasing and discouraging prospect, for the tone and tendency of their speculation goes
completely to identify all that is economically desirable with the progressive state (Mill,
1965, pp. 451-452).
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David Ricardo saw capitalistic society headed towards stagnation because of the
differential rates of rent on lands of differing qualities and because of the discrepancy between
fixed and circulating capital.
John Stuart Mill believed capitalistic society stagnating due to the ‘Law of Diminishing
Returns’, the Malthusian theory of population, and the loss of investment funds for the
improvement of the country.
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Chapter Three: Marxian Economics on Stagnation
In the previous chapter, we showed that David Ricardo in his Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation and John Stuart Mill in his Principles of Political Economy believed that
capitalistic society would end in stagnation. They based their theories on the Malthusian principles
of population, ‘The Law of Diminishing Returns’, and the tendency for profits to fall because of
the discrepancy between fixed and circulating capital.
Karl Marx and his followers saw the future of capitalism in a very negative light. They
believed it would eventually lead to an economy of stagnation, privation, and general misery
amongst people. We will now look into the reasoning and theory behind Marx’s belief in
stagnation.
Marx, in the first volume of Capital, rejected the validity of the Malthusian theory of
population. Marx stated that “an abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, and
only insofar as man has not interfered with them” (Marx, 1909, p. 271). He did speak on a “surplus
population” however:
The production of a relative surplus-population, or the setting free of laborers, goes on
therefore yet more rapidly than the technical revolution of the process of production that
accompanies, and is accelerated by, the advances of accumulation; and more rapidly than
the corresponding diminution of the variable part of capital as compared with the constant.
If the means of production, as they increase in extent and effective power, become to a less
extent means of employment of laborers, this state of things is again modified by the fact
that in proportion as the productiveness of labor increases, capital increases its supply of
labor more quickly than its demand for laborers. The overwork of the employed part of
the working class swells the ranks of the reserve, whilst conversely the greater pressure
that the latter by its competition exerts on the former, forces these to submit to overwork
and to subjugation under the dictates of capital. The condemnation of one part of the
working-class to enforced idleness by the overwork of the other part, and the converse
becomes a means of enriching the individual capitalists, and accelerates at the same time
the production of the industrial reserve army on a scale corresponding with the advance of
social accumulation (Marx, 1947, 697-699).
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He believed that capitalistic society would be forced into stagnation by ‘The Industrial
Reserve Army of the Unemployed’, and by the ‘Law of the Increasing Misery of the Proletariat’.
Marx, in analyzing a formula of growth saw capital as an independent variable and labor as a
dependent variable. Over time, capital will control labor because of technological advancements.
The disposable industrial army reserve would continue to grow as technology improves leading to
a lower return on surplus-value.
But if a surplus laboring population is a necessary product of accumulation or the
development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus production become, conversely,
the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist mode
of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite
as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost. Independently, of the limits of the
actual increase of population, it creates, for the changing needs of the self-expansion of
capital, a mass of human material always ready for exploitation. With accumulation, and
the development of the productiveness of labor that accompanies it, the power of sudden
expansion of capital grows also. The mass of social wealth, overflowing with the advance
of accumulation, and transformable into additional capital, thrusts itself frantically into old
branches of production, whose market suddenly expands, or into newly formed branches,
such as railways, the need for which grows out of development of the old ones. In all such
cases, there must be the possibility of throwing great masses of men suddenly on the
decisive points without withdrawing them from the other branches of production.
Overpopulation supplies these masses. The course characteristic of modern industry, viz.,
a decennial cycle (interrupted by smaller oscillations) of periods of average activity,
production at high pressure, crisis and stagnation, depends on the constant formation, the
greater or lesser absorption, and the reformation of the industrial reserve or surplus
population (Marx, 1909, pp. 275-277).

In his theory of surplus-value, Marx found his way to a conclusion of capitalistic
exploitation of the working class, which is also found in the works of John Stuart Mill and David
Ricardo. John McConnell described Marx’s theory of surplus value as:
Labor is paid on the basis of its physical reproduction and maintenance costs; but the
laborer is required to work hours over and above the necessary to meet these costs. Thus
every additional hour that he works above the point necessary to produce sufficient articles
to supply the laborer’s reproduction and maintenance costs (his wages), he is producing
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value which is appropriated by the employer. This value above his reproduction and
maintenance costs is surplus-value (McConnell, 1947, pp. 33-34).

The Marxian theory of stagnation also focuses on the theory of constant and variable
capital. Constant capital referred to the value of the part of capital put out by the capitalist for
acquiring means of production, such as, raw and auxiliary materials, and instruments of labor is
therefore not altered in the course of the process of production. Variable capital is the value of the
part of capital used to purchase labor power and is altered during the process of production. It
reproduces its own value and yields a surplus-value over and above constant capital. This surplusvalue can be greater or less as the case may be. This part of capital is being continually transformed
from a constant or unchangeable magnitude into a variable or changeable one. Therefore, it is
called variable capital (Marx, 1906, pp. 232-233).
Marx describes the difference between constant capital and variable capital in the following
passage:
Suppose a capitalist to employ a hundred workmen, at thirty pounds a year each, in a carpet
factory. The variable capital annually laid out amounts, therefore, to 3,000 pounds.
Suppose also that he discharges fifty of his workers, and employs fifty with machinery that
costs him 1,500 pounds. To simplify the matter, we take no account of buildings, coal, etc.
Further suppose that the raw material annually consumed costs 3,000 pounds, both before
and after the change. Is any capital set free by this metamorphosis? Before the change,
the total sum of 6,000 pounds consisted half of constant, and half of variable capital. After
the change it consists of 4,500 constant (3,000 pounds raw material and 1,500 pounds
machinery), and 1,500 variable capital. The variable capital, instead of being one half, is
only one quarter of the total capital. Instead of being set free, a part of the capital is here
locked up in such a way as to cease to be exchanged against labor-power; variable has been
changed into constant capital (Marx, 1906, pp. 478-479).

The preceding observation by Marx on the different compositions of constant and variable
capital led him to his creation of the Law of Falling Tendency of the Rate of Profit. The law states
that with each new addition of capital to the constant capital there will be a reduction in the amount
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of variable capital. The capitalist makes his profits from the exploitation of the laborer. So, if
more capital is put into machinery, the capitalist receives less surplus-value since only labor can
produce surplus-value. The increased use of machinery, therefore, leads to the fall of the rate of
profits, and eventually leads to stagnation because of the loss of surplus-value upon which basis
the capitalistic system rests (Marx, 1909, pp. 247-249).
If the average rate of profit for society tends to fall due to the difference in the makeup of
constant and variable capital, how would stagnation be prevented according to Marx?
Marx stated in his theory of The Law of Concentration that larger industries would band
together in order to obtain more surplus-value from the worker and jointly share the burden of the
increasing amounts of constant capital. He also believed the stagnation caused by discrepancy of
constant and variable capital might be postponed by the following methods, such as, cheapening
the elements of constant capital, raising the intensity of exploitation, depression of wages below
their value, relative overpopulation, and foreign trade (Marx, 1909, pp. 272-278).
Before Marx, economists were somewhat pessimistic and predicted stagnation in the long
term. However, Marx and his followers left no doubt as to the future of capitalistic society.
The barriers of the capitalistic mode of production becomes apparent after our study:
1. The fact that the development of the productive powers of labor creates in the
falling rate of profit a law which turns into an antagonism of this mode of
production at a certain point and requires for its defeat a periodic crisis.
2. The fact the expansion or contraction of production is determined by the
appropriation of unpaid labor, and by the proportion of the unpaid labor to the
materialized labor in general, or to speak the language of the capitalist, is
determined by profits and by the proportion of this profit to the employed
capital, by a definite rate of profit, instead of being determined the relation of
production to social wants, to the wants of socially developed human beings.
The capitalistic mode of production, for this reason, meets with barriers at a
certain scale of production which would be inadequate under different
conditions. It comes to a standstill at a point determined by the production and
realization of profit, not by the satisfaction of social needs (Marx, 1909, p. 303).
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Answering the question of methods of preventing stagnation, Marx said “…capitalistic
production is continually engaged in the attempt to overcome these imminent barriers, but it
overcomes them only by means which again place the same barriers in the way in a more
formidable size” (Marx, 1925, p. 293).
Marx believed that capitalistic society would come to an end when the Reserve Army of
the Unemployed forced by the Law of Increasing Misery of the Proletariat arose and revolted
against their oppressors, and established over themselves the Dictatorship of the Proletariat until
the masses were trained to no longer need any form of government whatsoever. Without this
revolution, Marx saw no actual solution to the dilemma posed by the laws of capitalistic production
and the eventual stagnation of the economy.

16

Chapter Four: Institutional Economics on Stagnation
Institutional economics has many followers but for our purpose of analyzing the views on
stagnation, we will mainly focus on the writings of Thorstein Veblen. Before continuing to our
examination of Veblen’s theory of stagnation in capitalistic societies, we must first examine some
of the preconceptions of Institutional economics.
The economic thought of the Classical economist is based in Classical philosophy with its
doctrines of ‘Natural and Immutable Laws’, and the Malthusian theory of population. Marxian
economist’s thought is founded in the idealistic philosophy of Hegel. The economic thought of
Institutional economists is based on the same preconceptions of ‘Instrumentalism’ of John Dewey
and the ‘Pragmatism’ of William James. In other terms, Institutional economics, Instrumentalism,
Pragmatism, and Logic are all based on the doctrines of the Metaphysical Club, founded by Charles
S. Pierce in the 1860s. The club was attended by William James, John Fiske, Chauncey Wright,
and a few other intellectuals from Cambridge (Hofstadter, 1945, pp. 105-106).
Thorstein Veblen’s theory of stagnation, which we will examine more closely, is based on
a dichotomy of technology and institutions. The dichotomy in Veblen’s thinking develops from
his early training in Hegelian philosophy (Dorfman, 1947, pp. 40-45) and from the teachings of
Charles S. Pierce (Daugert, 1950, pp. 16-25). However, this dichotomous thinking of Veblen may
also be observed in John Dewey’s thinking – for technology substitute education and for the
imbecile institutions substitute “the quest for certainty” (Dewey, 1929).
Veblen’s theory of economic stagnation of society may be best captured from his analysis
of the machine process and business enterprise. Veblen defines the machine process in the
following way:
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In its bearing on modern life and modern business, the machine process means something
more comprehensive and less external than a mere aggregate of mechanical appliances for
the meditation of human labor. It means that, but it means something more than that. The
civil engineer, the mechanical engineer, the navigator, the mining expert, the industrial
chemist and the mineralogist, the electrician – the work of all these fall within the line of
the modern machine process, as well as the work of the inventor who devises the appliances
of the process and that of the mechanician who puts the inventions into effect and oversees
their working. The scope of the process is larger than the machine. In those branches of
industry in which the machine methods have been introduced, many agencies which are
not to be classed as mechanical appliances, simply have been drawn into the process and
have become integral factors in it. Chemical properties of minerals, e.g., are counted on in
the carrying out of metallurgical processes with much the same certainty and calculable
effect as are the motions of those mechanical appliances by whose use the minerals are
handled. The sequence of the process involves both the one and the other, both the
apparatus and the materials, in such intimate interaction that the process cannot be spoken
of simply as an action of the apparatus upon the materials. It is not simply that the
apparatus reshapes the materials: the materials reshape themselves by the help of the
apparatus. Similarly, in such other processes as the refining of petroleum, oil, or sugar; in
the work of the industrial chemical laboratories; in the use of wind, water, or electricity
(Veblen, 1904, pp. 5-6).

Veblen goes on to define business enterprise:
The economic welfare of the community at large is best served by a facile and uninterrupted
interplay of the various processes which make up the industrial system at large; but the
pecuniary interests of the business men in whose hands lies the discretion in the matter are
not necessarily best served by an unbroken maintenance of the industrial balance.
Especially is this true as regards those greater business men whose interests are very
extensive. The pecuniary operations of these latter are of large scope, and their fortunes
commonly are not permanently bound up with the smooth working of a given Sub−process
in the industrial system. Their fortunes are rather related to the larger conjunctures of the
industrial system as a whole, the interstitial adjustments, or to conjunctures affecting large
ramifications of the system. Nor is it at all uniformly to their interest to enhance the smooth
working of the industrial system at large in so far as they are related to it. Gain may come
to them from a given disturbance of the system whether the disturbance makes for
heightened facility or for widespread hardship, very much as a speculator in grain futures
may be either a bull or a bear. To the business man who aims at a differential gain arising
out of interstitial adjustments or disturbances of the industrial system, it is not a material
question whether his operations have an immediate furthering or hindering effect upon the
system at large. The end is pecuniary gain, the means is disturbance of the industrial
system, − except so far as the gain is sought by the old−fashioned method of permanent
investment in some one industrial or commercial plant, a case which is for the present left
on one side as not bearing on the point immediately in hand (Veblen, 1904, pp. 27-28).
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Before beginning our analysis of Veblen’s theory of capitalistic stagnation, we must first
examine his thoughts on the business cycle for any information that may help us understand his
analysis of stagnation.
Veblen attributes the business cycle to the use of loan credit. He writes:
An industrial crisis is a period of liquidation, cancelment of credits, high discount rates,
falling prices and "forced sales," and shrinkage of values. It has as a sequel, both severe
and lasting, a shrinkage of capitalization throughout the field affected by it. It leaves the
business men collectively poorer, in terms of money value; but the property which they
hold between them may not be appreciably smaller in point of physical magnitude or of
mechanical efficiency than it was before the liquidation set in. It commonly also involves
an appreciable curtailment of industry, more severe than lasting; but the effects which a
crisis has in industry proper are commonly not commensurate with its consequences in
business or with the importance attached to a crisis by the business community (Veblen,
1904, pp. 190-192).

Whereas Classical economists attribute depressions to the hand of God, Veblen explained
depressions are of necessity tied to the mechanisms of a capitalistic society and that the “immediate
occasion of such a crisis, then, is that there arises a practical discrepancy between the earlier
effective capitalization on which the collateral has been accepted by the creditors, and the
subsequent effective capitalization of the same collateral shown by quotations and sales of the
securities on the market” (Veblen, 1904, p. 193).
Put in other terms, Veblen was of the opinion that depressions are “a malady of the
affections. The discrepancy which discourages business men is a discrepancy between that
nominal capitalization which they have set their hearts upon through habituation in the immediate
past and that actual capitalizable value of their property which its current earning−capacity will
warrant” (Veblen, 1904, p. 237).
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Veblen held the belief that crises and depressions do not destroy the material wealth of a
community, rather, only the income of the businessman.
Under the old order, industry, and even such trade as there was, was a quest of livelihood;
under the new order industry is directed by the quest of profits. Formerly, therefore, times
were good or bad according as the industrial processes yielded a sufficient or an insufficient
output of the means of life. Latterly times are good or bad according as the process of
business yields an adequate or inadequate rate of profits. The controlling end is different
in the present, and the question of welfare turns on the degree of success with which this
different ulterior end is achieved. Prosperity now means, primarily, business prosperity;
whereas it used to mean industrial sufficiency (Veblen, 1904, p. 178).

John Maynard Keynes in his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money once said in reference to the business cycle and full employment: “I doubt that, except
during war (World War I), we have had any recent experience of a boom so strong that it led to
full employment” (Keynes, 1936, p. 322).
Thirty years before this statement by Keynes, Veblen had some similarly interesting
remarks:
It might even be a tenable generalization, though perhaps unnecessarily broad, to say that
for a couple of decades past the normal condition of industrial business has been a mild but
chronic state of depression, and that any marked departure from commonplace dull times
has attracted attention as a particular case calling for a particular explanation (Veblen,
1904, p. 184).

Before proceeding to the examination of Veblen’s theory of stagnation, we turn to Joseph
Dorfman to summarize Veblen’s theory of the business cycle.
The scope and method of modern industry are given by the machine. The machine process
implies and enforces a sweeping standardization of processes, goods, services, and
consumers. Mankind, in order to get along with the machine process and reap the benefits
of its efficiency, must adapt itself to its impersonal, standardized requirements. The
machine process denotes a reasoned procedure as against the rule of thumb of the
traditional scheme of control, where personal propensity is the dominant feature and where
the industrial processes and material procedures must adapt themselves to the needs of the
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big businessman. Advance in industrial efficiency is due to the comprehensive,
concatenated character of the entire process, and the economic welfare of the community
is best served by a facile and uninterrupted inter-play of its various parts.
But the greater gains of the modern captain are made in disturbing the delicate interstitial
adjustments between plants and processes. Great profits are achieved not from productive
efficiency, but from the shifts in the distribution of ownership in vendible capital or
securities. The modern captain is interested not in the permanent efficiency of the
industrial system or of any plant, but in the control of a segment of the system for the
strategic purpose of influencing the security market for the flotation of securities, the
maneuvering of a coalition or any other well-known method of manipulation. The results
of his maneuvering and strategic activity is a chronic perturbation of industry, which has
become the normal state of affairs. The modern captain does not create opportunities for
increasing industrial efficiency, but only watches for opportunities to put his competitors
in an uncomfortable position; cut-throat competition, rate wars, duplication, misdirection,
wasted efforts, and even delay of improvements long after they are advisable are the price
the community pays. When the game between competing business interests is played to a
finish, in a coalition of the competitors under single management, then it may proceed more
obviously as a conflict between the monopoly and the community. By virtue of the delicate
character of the industrial process as a while, a small apparent disturbance by the captains
has a cumulative effect throughout the system far in excess of the original disturbance and
is typified by such phenomena as crises and depressions. (Dorfman, 1947, pp. 225-226)

With our conclusion of Veblen’s theory of the business cycle, we can now resume our
examination of Veblen’s theory of stagnation of the capitalistic society.
The Classical and Marxian economists, in the previous chapters, were shown to have very
pessimistic views of the stationary state. However, for a truly dismal picture of a capitalistic
society, you must look at the works of Veblen in which he discusses capitalistic stagnation.
Veblen’s discussion of stagnation takes two directions. The first is in the direction of a changed
social situation and more equitable utilization of resources that are derived from the machine
process. The second direction is one of a revision to barbarism, militarism, and patriotism.
Veblen develops two differing views of stagnation in his writings. In The Theory of
Business Enterprise, he has hopes for the future; however, in Absentee Ownership his view is
completely gloomy. In an effort to see these distinctions in Veblen’s thinking, it is necessary to
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examine the two books separately. First, we will examine stagnation references in The Theory of
Business Enterprise and then turn our attention to Absentee Ownership.
The Classical economists viewed stagnation as an end in itself, and the Marxian economists
conceived capitalistic stagnation as a phase leading to the overthrow of the system completely by
the revolt of the proletariat. Keynesian economists, as we will see later, believe stagnation will be
staved off by the government’s manipulation of the money markets and through nationalization of
national industries. Veblen, however, sees stagnation leading either to a total discontinuation of
capitalism or to a maintenance of the status quo through ‘force and fraud.’
Veblen believed stagnation would arise in a capitalistic society due to the business cycle
and the perfection of competition, as well as from nationalism and the status system, “under the
regime of a perfected machine industry and perfect business organization, with active competition
throughout, it is at least probable that depression would not be seriously interrupted by any other
cause.” (Veblen, 1904, p. 245)
Veblen also maintained that stagnation will be the result a ‘conscientious withdrawal of
productive efficiency’ in a machine civilization.
Depression and industrial stagnation follow only in case the pecuniary exigencies of the
situation are of such a character as to affect the traffic of the business community in an
inhibitory way. But business is the quest of profits, and an inhibition of this quest must
touch the seat of its vital motives. Industrial depression means that the business men
engaged do not see their way to derive a satisfactory gain from letting the industrial process
go forward on the lines and in the volume for which the material equipment of industry is
designed. It is not worth their while, and it might even work them pecuniary harm.
Commonly their apprehension of the discrepancy which forbids an aggressive pursuit of
industrial business is expressed by the phrase "overproduction." An alternative phrase,
intended to cover the same concept, but less frequently employed, is ‘underconsumption.’
(Veblen, 1904, pp. 213-214)
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We have pointed out that Veblen saw capitalistic society doomed for stagnation due to the
following cultural lags: the business cycle, the conscientious withdrawal of productive efficiency,
and from the devotion to the imbecile institutions of government, church, national sentiments, and
education.
So, does Veblen see any escape from this dilemma of stagnation? Veblen sees it prevented
by either of these two methods: a more equitable distribution of the goods of society, or a reversion
to militarism.
The largest and most promising factor of cultural discipline − most promising as a
corrective of iconoclastic vagaries − over which business principles rule is national politics.
The purposes and the material effects of business politics have already been spoken of
above, but in the present connection their incidental, disciplinary effects are no less
important. Business interests urge an aggressive national policy and business men direct it.
Such a policy is warlike as well as patriotic. The direct cultural value of a warlike business
policy is unequivocal. It makes for a conservative animus on the part of the populace.
During war time, and within the military organization at all times, under martial law, civil
rights are in abeyance; and the more warfare and armament the more abeyance. Military
training is a training in ceremonial precedence, arbitrary command, and unquestioning
obedience. A military organization is essentially a servile organization. Insubordination is
the deadly sin. The more consistent and the more comprehensive this military training, the
more effectually will the members of the community be trained into habits of subordination
and away from that growing propensity to make light of personal authority that is the chief
infirmity of democracy. This applies first and most decidedly, of course, to the soldiery,
but it applies only in a less degree to the rest of the population. They learn to think in
warlike terms of rank, authority, and subordination, and so grow progressively more patient
of encroachments upon their civil rights.
…Warlike and patriotic preoccupations fortify the barbarian virtues of subordination and
prescriptive authority. Habituation to a warlike, predatory scheme of life is the strongest
disciplinary factor that can be brought to counteract the vulgarization of modern life
wrought by peaceful industry and the machine process, and to rehabilitate the decaying
sense of status and differential dignity.
In this direction, evidently, lies the hope of a corrective for "social unrest" and similar
disorders of civilized life. There can, indeed, be no serious question but that a consistent
return to the ancient virtues of allegiance, piety, servility, graded dignity, class prerogative,
and prescriptive authority would greatly conduce to popular content and to the facie
management of affairs. Such is the promise held out by a strenuous national policy.
(Veblen, 1904, pp. 392-393)
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Veblen was of the belief that a return to ‘the old virtues’ of militarism and a strenuous
national policy would prevent stagnation; however, even in this dismal passage he takes heart and
states:
It is difficult to believe that the machine technology and the pursuit of the material sciences
will be definitively superseded, for the reason, among others, that any community which
loses these elements of its culture thereby loses that brute material force that gives it
strength against its rivals. (Veblen, 1904, p. 400)

The preceding passages that appeared in 1904 proved Veblen’s doubts as to the lasting
qualities of a capitalistic society that employed the machine process merely as an aid to increasing
its income, but in 1923, these were his sentiments:
…With every further move along the lines on which the industrial arts are advancing,
therefore, sabotage – that is to say the strategic unemployment at the instance of the owneremployer or of the workmen – becomes a swifter and more widely corrosive agency of
miscarriage and decay.
At the same time, and in great part by help of these same technical appliances and powers,
the business community is able, also in a progressive fashion to bring sound conservative
business principles to bear on industry in a swifter and more comprehensive way and with
a slighter margin of error. That is to say novelties will be disallowed with a freer hand and
the tactical maneuvers of unemployment will gain something in frequency and amplitude;
measures to suppress or disable the organization of workmen and malcontent will take on
added scope, assurance, vigor, and dispatch. (Veblen, 1924, p. 421)

Once more in Absentee Ownership Veblen states, “It is conceivable that the civilized
peoples might yet save themselves alive out of this impasse of their addiction to business, if it were
not for their national integrity.” (Veblen, 1924, p. 422)
Uncritical devotion to the national pretensions being a meritorious habit, it is also a useful
article of camouflage, a shelter for gainful enterprises and transactions which might otherwise be
open to doubt, a means of avoiding unfavorable notice of procuring a profitable line of good will.
(Veblen, 1924, p. 427)
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Veblen finishes Absentee Ownership with the following words in reference to capitalistic
stagnation:
The outlook should accordingly be that the businesslike control of the industrial system in
detail should presently reach, if it has not already reached, and should speedily pass beyond
that critical point of chronic derangement in the aggregate beyond which a continued
pursuit of the same strategy on the same businesslike principles will result in a
progressively widening margin of deficiency in the aggregate material output and a
progressive shrinkage of the available means of life. (Veblen, 19224, p. 445)

In other words, capitalistic society will end either in a more equitable distribution of the
goods of society or in a militaristic state as a result of stagnation. Finally, we can look the
following passage from Veblen to summarize:
It seems possible to say this much, that the full dominion of business enterprise is
necessarily a transitory dominion. It stands to lose in the end whether the one or the other
of the two divergent cultural tendencies wins, because it is incompatible with the
ascendancy of either. (Veblen, 1904, p. 400)
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Chapter Five: Keynes on Stagnation
As discussed in previous chapters, Classical, Marxian, and Institutional economists all saw
the future of capitalistic civilization as one of stagnation. John Stuart Mill and his followers were
of the opinion that this state of stagnation would be reached in a highly advanced civilization (Mill
746-751). Marx and his followers considered this state of stagnation merely as a phase of the
dialectical movement leading to a classless society. Veblen saw capitalistic society doomed for
stagnation due to cultural lags such as the business cycle, the conscientious withdrawal of
productive efficiency, and from the devotion to the imbecile institutions of government, church,
national sentiments, and education.
John Maynard Keynes in his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money, attempted to discover methods by which capitalistic society might be saved from
unemployment, depression, and eventual stagnation. In this chapter, we will examine Keynes’
writing in order to point out certain postulates of the Keynesian system that will lead to capitalistic
stagnation.
The theory of stagnation that arises from the doctrines of the Keynesian system can be
viewed through two separate vantage points. The first is the marginal efficiency of capital and the
rate of interest. Keynes on the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest:
I define the marginal efficiency as being equal to the rate of discount which would make
the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns expected from the capitalassets during its life just equal to its supply price. This gives it the marginal efficiencies
of particular types of capital-assets. The greatest of these marginal efficiencies can then
be regarded as the marginal efficiency of capital in general (Keynes, 1936, pp. 135-136).

The rate of interest is in itself nothing more than the inverse proportion between a sum of
money and what can be obtained for parting with control over the money in exchange for
a debt for a stated period of time (Keynes, 1936, p. 167).
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The second vantage point from which we can view the theory of stagnation is the liquidity
preference and the propensity to consume. Keynes also takes the liberty of defining these concepts
for us:
Liquidity-preference is a potentiality of functional tendency, which fixes the quantity of
money which the public will hold when the rate of interest is given so that if r is the rate of
interest, M the quantity of money and L the function of liquidity preference, we have M =
L (r) (Keynes, 1936, p. 168).

We shall define the propensity to consume as the functional relationship X between Yw as
a given level of income in terms of wage-units, and Cw the expenditure on consumption
out of that level of income so that: Cw = X(Yw) or C = W. X(Yw) (Keynes, 1936, p. 90).

Keynesian economics emerged as an attempt to solve the numerous problems facing
society in the days of the Great Depression of 1929-1939. Keynes’ writings were revolutionary in
his approach to economic problems.
Keynes believed that full employment might be reached by widening the gap between the
marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest. As evidenced by the following passage,
Keynes believed that interest was a reward for not hoarding which is in contrast to Classical
economists who believed interest was a reward for saving.
It is to our best advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that point relatively to the schedule
of the marginal efficiency of capital at which there is full employment. There can be no
doubt that this criterion will lead to a much lower rate of interest than has ruled hitherto;
and, so far as one can guess at the schedules of the marginal efficiency of capital
corresponding to increasing amounts of capital, the rate of interest is likely to fall steadily,
if it should be practicable to maintain conditions of more or less continuous full
employment—unless, indeed, there is an excessive change in the aggregate propensity to
consume (including the State).
I feel sure that the demand for capital is strictly limited in the sense that it would not be
difficult to increase the stock of capital up to a point where its marginal efficiency had
fallen to a very low figure. This would not mean that the use of capital instruments would
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cost almost nothing, but only that the return from them would have to cover little more
than their exhaustion by wastage and obsolescence together with some margin to cover risk
and the exercise of skill and judgment. In short, the aggregate return from durable goods
in the course of their life would, as in the case of short-lived goods, just cover their labourcosts of production plus an allowance for risk and the costs of skill and supervision.
Now, though this state of affairs would be quite compatible with some measure of
individualism, yet it would mean the euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the
euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity value
of capital. Interest to-day rewards no genuine sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land.
The owner of capital can obtain interest because capital is scarce, just as the owner of land
can obtain rent because land is scarce (Keynes, 1936, pp. 375-376).

The preceding quotation does not provide the entire reasoning behind Keynes’ belief that
full employment may be reached by lowering the rate of interest. The following quotation,
however, may clear things up:
If there is some tendency to a measure of long-run uniformity in the state of liquiditypreference, there may well be some sort of rough relationship between the national income
and the quantity of money required to satisfy liquidity-preference, taken as a mean over
periods of pessimism and optimism together. There may be, for example, some fairly stable
proportion of the national income more than which people will not readily keep in the shape
of idle balances for long periods together, provided the rate of interest exceeds a certain
psychological minimum; so that if the quantity of money beyond what is required in the
active circulation is in excess of this proportion of the national income, there will be a
tendency sooner or later for the rate of interest to fall to the neighbourhood of this
minimum. The falling rate of interest will then, cet. par., increase effective demand, and
the increasing effective demand will reach one or more of the semi-critical points at which
the wage-unit will tend to show a discontinuous rise, with a corresponding effect on prices
(Keynes, 1936, pp. 306-307).

The gap that can be made to exist between the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency
of capital may be manipulated by the government, according to Keynes. This is executed in order
to deliver full employment and a high propensity to consume, which will in turn solve the problem
of secular stagnation.
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With the constant lowering of the rate of interest, the zero gap is created between the rate
of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital which will stimulate investment and lead to full
employment. However, it seems that this type of action will lead to a reduction in the marginal
efficiency of capital to zero. If that happens as a result of lowering the rate of interest to zero, has
the problem of secular stagnation been removed or only postponed for a brief period of time?
Keynes expressed his doubts about the effectiveness of this solution to stagnation and
unemployment in these words, “Thus even if the rate of interest is zero, there is a strict limit to the
proportion of prospective consumers’ demand which it is profitable to begin providing for in
advance” (Keynes, 1936, pp. 217).
Keynes went on to state in his General Theory that monetary policy alone is not always
enough to remedy an economic downturn or stagnation. This has been used as an argument for
deficit spending as an answer for secular stagnation.
For my own part I am now somewhat skeptical of the success of a merely monetary policy
directed towards influencing the rate of interest. I expect to see the State, which is in a
position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on long views and on the
basis of the general social advantage, taking an ever greater responsibility for directly
organizing investment; since it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation
of the marginal efficiency of different types of capital, calculated on the principles I have
described above, will be too great to be offset by any practicable changes in the rate of
interest (Keynes, 1936, p. 164).

Now that we have shown that the theory of stagnation is inherently a part of Keynes’ theory
of monetary manipulation, we can shift our attention to the discrepancy between the propensity to
consume and the propensity to save and their relation to the theory of secular stagnation.
In his General Theory, Keynes lists the following objective factors influencing the
propensity to consume:

29

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

A change in the wage units.
A change in the difference between income and net income.
Windfall changes in capital-values not allowed for in calculating net income.
Changes in the rate of time-discounting.
Changes in fiscal policy.
Changes in expectations of the relation between the present and the future level
of income (Keynes, 1936, pp. 91-95).

Considering these factors influencing the propensity to consume, Keynes concluded, “In a
given situation the propensity to consume may be considered a fairly stable function, provided that
we have eliminated changes in the wage-unit in terms of money” (Keynes, 1936, p. 95).
The propensity to consume is one of the factors that contributes to employment and to the
full utilization of economic resources; therefore, if the propensity to consume remains stable or
tends to fall there will be a tendency for the economy to have less than full employment and the
economy will eventually stagnate. Keynes concluded from his examination of the trend in the
propensity to consume and the propensity to save that,
…there has been a chronic tendency throughout human history for the propensity to save
to be stronger than the inducement to invest. The weakness of the inducement to invest has
been at all times the key to the economic problem. Today the explanation of the weakness
of this inducement may chiefly lie in the extent of existing accumulations; whereas,
formerly, risks and hazards of all kinds may have played a larger part. But the result is the
same. The desire of, the individual to augment his personal wealth by abstaining from
consumption has usually been stronger than the inducement to the entrepreneur to augment
the national wealth by employing labour on the construction of durable assets (Keynes,
1936, pp. 347-348).

If the propensity to consume and the propensity to save are factors in full employment and
the development of the economic system, and there is a tendency for saving to exceed
consumption, what had prevented stagnation up to the point where Keynes wrote his General
Theory? Keynes answered that in the following way:
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… the frequency of war over the average of (say) each decade seems to have been
sufficient, taken in conjunction with the propensity to consume, to establish a schedule of
the marginal efficiency of capital which allowed a reasonably satisfactory average level of
employment to be compatible with a rate of interest high enough to be psychologically
acceptable to wealth-owners (Keynes, 1936, p. 307).

Keynes again stated that because of the discrepancy of the propensity to consume and the
propensity to save he doubted if, “except during the war (World War I) we have had any recent
experiences of a boom so strong that it led to full employment” (Keynes, 1936, p. 322).
In conclusion, our study of Keynes has shown that society will be driven into stagnation
by discrepancy in the propensity to consume and the propensity to save. We also examined the
relationship of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest and revealed that the
government manipulation of the rate of interest may postpone stagnation for a time. However, the
marginal efficiency of capital tends to fall to zero, and this in turn will lead capitalistic society into
stagnation.
As we will see in the next chapter, economists from Harvard University and other schools
used the General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money during the ‘Keynesian Revolution’
as a basis for their theories of ‘The Matured Economy’. We will mostly focus on the ideas of the
American economist, Alvin Hansen.
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Chapter Six: Alvin Hansen and the Matured Economy
The theories of ‘The Matured Economy’ were first introduced during the Keynesian
Revolution by various economists. We must first examine the theory and explain the basic
postulates of the matured economy. Here are the basic postulates of the theory of the matured
economy:
1. The declining rate of population. The decline in the birth rate according to these
economists, including Alvin Hansen, means that the entrepreneur cannot find enough
places in which to invest his money profitably. In turn, the economy becomes stagnant
and unemployment rises.
2. The disappearance of the frontiers, with the consequential loss of investment
opportunities. When there is no more land to explore or expand to, stagnation will set
in.
3. The lack of new industries that will create jobs and investment opportunities.
Economic growth will slow due to the lack of new business and jobs, also leading to
higher unemployment (Hansen, 1938).
These were the three reasons that would ultimately lead to secular stagnation in the
economy. Paul Sweezy summarizes Hansen’s stagnation theory:
According to this theory, the modern developed capitalist economy has an enormous
capacity to save, both because of its corporate structure and because of the very unequal
distribution of personal income. But if adequate profitable investment opportunities are
lacking, this saving potential translates not into real capital formation and sustained growth
but into lowered income, mass unemployment, and chronic depression, a condition
summed up in the term stagnation (Sweezy, 1982, p. 53).
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In a presentation given by Alvin Hansen in 1939, he was attempting to draw a contrast
between a cyclical period of slow growth and a structural change in the economy. Hansen was of
the mindset that the world at that time was not experiencing a normal downturn in the business
cycle, but rather, we were entering a new era of much slower growth. He stated, “We are passing,
so to speak, over a divide which separates the great era of growth and expansion of the nineteenth
century from an era which no man, unwilling to embark on pure conjecture, can yet characterize
with clarity or precision.” The Great Depression, in the eyes of Hansen, was something that might
last indefinitely because of structural changes (Hansen, 1939).
The first part of Hansen’s theory we will look at is the idea of declining population growth.
He believed the slower population growth would lead to slower economic growth. Here are
Hansen’s thoughts on the effect of population growth:
Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining
the character of the output; in other words, the com- position of the flow of final goods.
Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new
residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population
with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and
the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of
capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand
for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is
therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or
declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the
ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline (Hansen, 1939, p. 7).

Hansen believed that economists should resort to the ideas of Adam Smith on population
growth as opposed to the more pessimistic views of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo. Smith
thought population growth led to further growth and expansion. Ricardo and Malthus believed
that rapid population growth would likely lead to the stagnation of the capitalistic society.
Adam Smith regarded growth of population as at once a consequence and a cause of
economic progress. Increasing division of labor would, he argued, bring about greater
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productivity, and this would furnish an enlarged revenue and stock, from which would flow
an enlarged wages fund, an increased demand for labor, higher wages, and so economic
conditions favorable for population growth. Now a growing population, by widening the
market and by fostering inventiveness, in turn facilitated, he thought, division of labor and
so the production of wealth. Thus he arrived at an optimistic conclusion. Population
growth, he held, stimulated progress and this in turn stimulated further growth and
expansion. In contrast, the pessimistic analyses of Malthus and Ricardo stressed the
limitation of natural resources and the danger of an increasing population's pressing down
the margin of cultivation to a point at which real income would be reduced to a bare
subsistence level. In this static analysis the more dynamic approach of Adam Smith was
quite forgotten. If we wish to get a clear insight into the economic consequences of the
current decline in population growth, it is necessary to return to the suggestion of Adam
Smith and to explore more fully the causal inter- connection between economic progress,
capital formation and population growth (Hansen, 1939, pp. 2-3).

Hansen believed that a considerable amount of economic growth could be attributed to the
expansion to the western frontier. The development of new territories was certainly intertwined
with population growth. A big proportion of capital formation in the United States went into the
western frontier in the nineteenth century. Hansen concluded that, “the opening of new territory
and the growth of population were together responsible for a very large fraction-possibly
somewhere near one-half-of the total volume of new capital formation in the nineteenth century”
(Hansen, 1939, p. 9).
Hansen revealed that outlets for further investment in new territories were rapidly
diminishing. One would have to look somewhere else for new investment opportunities. Joseph
Schumpeter, another American economist, labeled Hansen’s theory the “theory of vanishing
investment opportunities” (Sweezy, 1982, p. 53).
Hansen thought it was up to the progress of technology to lead bring full employment and
more private investment. But would it be enough to offset the declining growth in population
which hurts economic growth? Hansen wrote,

34

Thus the outlets for new investment are rapidly narrowing down to those created by the
progress of technology. To be sure, the progress of technology itself played in the
nineteenth century a decisive role in the opening of new territory and as a stimulus to
population growth. But while technology can facilitate the opening of new territory, it
cannot create a new world or make the old one bigger than it is. And while the advance of
science, by reducing the death rate, was a major cause of the vast nineteenth-century
increase in population, no important further gains in this direction can possibly offset the
prevailing low birth rate. Thus the further progress of science can operate to open
investment outlets only through its direct influence on the technique of production (Hansen,
1939, pp. 9-10).

Hansen said there was no greater mistake in the analysis of economic trends than those
which finds that the advance of technology was a major cause of unemployment. He said that you
cannot discount the problem of technological unemployment which may be intensified as the
importance of capital-saving increases. However, you cannot disregard the type of innovations
that lead to new industries and which thereby creates new outlets for investment. Hansen said,
“What we need is not a slowing down in the progress of science and technology, but rather an
acceleration of that rate” (Hansen, 1939, p. 10).
The most important thing for the economy, according to Hansen, is the development of
new industries. With the decreasing expansion into new frontiers, it was up to technological
advancements to fill the void. New industries such as railroads and the automobile, contributed
greatly to economic growth. Also contributing to the growth was the construction of public roads
for these new automobiles. When these industries mature, however, new industries must emerge
to continue economic growth or the economy will inevitably stagnate.
And when a revolutionary new industry like the railroad or the automobile, after having
initiated in its youth a powerful upwards urge of investment activity, reaches maturity and
ceases to grow, as all industries finally must, the whole economy must experience a profound stagnation, unless indeed new developments take its place. It is not enough that a
mature industry continues its activity at a high level on a horizontal plane (Hansen, 1939,
pp. 10-11).
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Hansen said, “It is the cessation of growth which is disastrous.” After strong periods of
growth from particular industries, they will mature and growth will slow. When giant new
industries have spent their force, it can take a long time for something of equal magnitude to
emerge. Hansen pointed out that this phenomenon was taking place in the 1930s as no new
industries were emerging (Hansen, 1939, p. 11).
It was that failure of new industries emerging that was causing the slow or negative
economic growth along with unemployment.
But a full-fledged recovery calls for something more than the mere expenditure of
depreciation allowances. It requires a large outlay on new investment, and this awaits the
development of great new industries and new techniques. But such new developments are
not currently available in adequate volume. It is my growing conviction that the combined
effect of the decline in population growth, together with the failure of any really important
innovations of a magnitude sufficient to absorb large capital outlays, weighs very heavily
as an explanation for the failure of the recent recovery to reach full employment (Hansen,
1939, p. 11).

In the absence of adequate technological progress, what policies could be used in order to
stave off stagnation and maintain full employment? Hansen had a few different ideas, which are
generally agreed upon among Keynesian economists. Hansen believed that lowering the rate of
taxes on workers could strengthen consumption by directing more of their income towards
consumption rather to the government. Public investment is another tactic that can be used to
combat unemployment and slowing growth. Investments made in human and natural resources
and in consumers’ capital goods will serve the physical, recreational, and cultural needs of
community as a whole. Hansen warned that such programs, whether financed by taxation or
borrowing, may adversely affect the system of free enterprise.
Can a rising public debt owned internally be serviced by a scheme of taxation which will
not adversely affect the marginal return on new investment or the marginal cost of
borrowing? Can any tax system, designed to increase the propensity to consume by means
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of a drastic change in income distribution, be devised which will not progressively
encroach on private investment? (Hansen, 1939, p. 12).

Public spending is the easiest of all recovery methods, and therein lies its danger. If it is
carried too far, we neglect to attack those specific maladjustments without the removal of
which we cannot attain a workable cost-price structure, and therefore we fail to achieve the
otherwise available flow of private investment (Hansen, 1939, p. 14).

Hansen admitted that this problem of secular stagnation was quite difficult and there were
no definitive solutions. He said, “There are no easy answers to the problems that confront us. And
because this is true, economists will not perform their function if they fail to illustrate the rapidly
shifting course of economic development, and through such neglect unwittingly contribute to a
dangerous lag in adjustments to change.”
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Chapter Seven: Current Debate on Secular Stagnation
In November 2013, Lawrence Summers, former Treasury Secretary, delivered a speech to
the International Monetary Fund at a conference dedicated to crises of yesterday and today. In his
speech, Summers revived the idea of secular stagnation. Secular stagnation had not been talked
about in mainstream economic circles in decades. Since the conference, Summers has expanded
on this idea through other speeches and various opinion pieces in publications. Some economists
have come to his defense and others have criticized his outlook.
Lawrence Summers on Secular Stagnation
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the recovery has been fairly weak with slow
economic growth and an unemployment rate that has only recently fallen to near normal levels.
During the current recovery, real GDP growth for the six years following the end of the recession
in 2009 has only averaged 2.02% quarterly. The rate of growth during recoveries or non-recession
periods has steadily declined over the past thirty years. The recession of 1981-82 was followed
by a six-year average real GDP growth of 4.56%. The recovery after the 1990-91 recession seen
an average of 3.02% real GDP growth from 1991-1997. The recovery following the tech boom of
the late 1990s had an average of 2.70% real GDP growth rate for six years following the end of
the recession in 2002 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis) There is a downward trend for
economic growth post-recovery over the past three decades. The 1981-82 recession is the best
comparison to the most recent recession since the decline in GDP is similar and unemployment
reached nearly 11%. Growth following the 1981-82 recession far outpaced our current recovery.
Aside from economic growth, employment statistics have been difficult to get back to
normal levels. The unemployment rate is now around 5% but other employment statistics such as
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the employment-population ratio are still high. That number stands below 60%, which means over
40% of the population is not working. Before the downturn, the ratio stood above 63%. (Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
These factors caused Lawrence Summers and others to invoke the theory of secular
stagnation once again. Summers raised the idea that, “the American and global economies could
not rely on normal market mechanisms to assure full employment and strong growth without
sustained unconventional policy support.” His worries stemmed from a few different items. First,
despite financial repair largely taking place five years ago, the recovery has only kept up with
population growth and normal productivity growth in the United States. It’s even worse in other
industrialized countries. Second, unsustainable bubbles and loose credit standards seemed to only
create moderate economic growth. Third, short-term interest rates are severely constrained by zero
lower bound and there is little room for further reduction which means real interest rates may not
be able to fall far enough to spur enough investment to lead to full employment. Fourth, in this
type of situation falling wages and prices or inflation that is below expectations is likely to worsen
economic performance by encouraging consumers and investors to delay spending and to
redistribute income and wealth from higher spending debtors to lower spending creditors
(Summers, 2013).
At a policy conference for the National Association for Business Economics, Summers
posed the question, “Can we identify any sustained stretch during which the economy grew
satisfactorily with conditions that were financially sustainable?” Summers looked at various
economic indicators during the recovery and revealed that the recovery itself was very weak as
compared to past recoveries, which tended to be quite strong.
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The record of growth for the last ﬁve years is disturbing, but I think that is not the whole
of what should concern us. It is true that prior to the downturn in 2007, through the period
from, say, 2002 until 2007, the economy grew at a satisfactory rate. Note that, there is no
clear evidence of overheating. Inﬂation did not accelerate in any substantial way. But the
economy did grow at a satisfactory rate, and did certainly achieve satisfactory levels of
capacity utilization and employment.
Did it do so in a sustainable way? I would suggest not. It is now clear that the increase in
house prices was associated with an unsustainable upward movement in the share of GDP
devoted to residential investment. And this made possible a substantial increase in the
debt-to-income ratio for households, which has been reversed only to a limited extent.
It is fair to say that critiques of macroeconomic policy during this period, almost without
exception, suggest that prudential policy was insufﬁciently prudent, that ﬁscal policy was
excessively expansive, and that monetary policy was excessively loose (Summers, 2014,
pp. 66-67).

Summers goes onto to explain in speech at the NABE policy conference that the data is not
kind to industrial countries over the last fifteen years. The future does not look bright for those
countries to maintain full employment and sustain growth.
In sum, I would suggest to you that the record of industrial countries over the last 15 years
is profoundly discouraging as to the prospect of maintaining substantial growth with
ﬁnancial stability. Why is this the case? I would suggest that in understanding this
phenomenon, it is useful at the outset to consider the possibility that changes in the structure
of the economy have led to a signiﬁcant shift in the natural balance between savings and
investment, causing a decline in the equilibrium or normal real rate of interest that is
associated with full employment (Summers, 2014, p. 69).

Summers also speaks of the decline in the equilibrium real rate of interest. He ponders if
it is a plausible hypothesis currently:
Let us imagine, as a hypothesis, that this decline in the equilibrium real rate of interest has
taken place. What would one expect to see? One would expect increasing difﬁculty,
particularly in the down phase of the cycle, in achieving full employment and strong growth
because of the constraints associated with the zero lower bound on interest rates. One
would expect that, as a normal matter, real interest rates would be lower. With very low
real interest rates and with low inﬂation, this also means very low nominal interest rates,
so one would expect increasing risk-seeking by investors. As such, one would expect
greater reliance on Ponzi ﬁnance and increased ﬁnancial instability (Summers, 2014, p.
69).
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There are six different reasons why Summers believes this hypothesis is reasonable for
today’s situation.
First he says is a decrease in demand for debt-financed investment. He says it can mostly
be attributed to the changing character of productive economic activity. Capital investment is not
as necessary as it once was in the past due to technological advances. The reduced demand for
investment will lead to changes for equilibrium levels of interest rates.
Secondly, Summers invokes Alvin Hansen in relation to the declining rate of population
growth. The labor force of the United States will grow at a much slower pace the next two decades
than it has over the last two decades.
Third, changes in the distribution of income, both between labor income and capital income
and between the wealthy and those with little wealth, have operated to raise the propensity to save,
as have increases in corporate-retained earnings. Reduced investment demand and an increased
propensity to save work in the direction of a lower equilibrium real interest rate.
Fourth, there has been a shift downward in the relative price of capital equipment. The
cheaper capital goods mean that investment goods can be completed with less borrowing which
reduces the propensity for investment.
Although Summers does not focus on this point too much, he says there is a legitimate
argument that what matters in an economy is after-tax, rather than pre-tax, real interest rates, and
the consequence of disinflation is that for any given after-tax real interest rate, the pretax real
interest rate now needs to be lower than before.
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Finally, there has been plenty of global moves to accumulate central bank reserves. Most
of those reserves are in the form of the safe assets, such as U.S. Treasuries. Each of these factors
has operated to reduce natural or equilibrium real interest rates (Summers, 2014, pp. 70-71).
So if this view is accepted as reality, what are the possible responses according to
Summers? He gives us three responses: (1) Stay patient, (2) Reduce the real rate of interest, and
(3) Raise demand (Summers, 2014, pp. 71-73).
The response of being patient is one that Japan has followed for many years according to
Summers. He also states that the United States has essentially pursued this strategy for the last
three or four years. Policy has limited impact. Summers says we are facing an inverse Say’s Law.
Say’s Law is where supply creates its own demand but currently, we are observing that lack of
demand creates its own lack of supply (Summers, p. 71).
The second response Summers suggests is to reduce the actual rate of interest. If the natural
rate of interest has declined, then logically, it is appropriate to lower the actual rate of interest to
permit adequate economic growth. Summers believes this is a better response than no response;
however, he is skeptical that rates that stay at or below zero for a substantial time could lead to
financial bubbles.
Finally, Summers believes that raising demand through fiscal policy is a proper response
to secular stagnation.
The preferable strategy, I would argue, is to raise the level of demand at any given rate of
interest—raising the level of output consistent with an increased level of equilibrium rates
and mitigating the various risks associated with low interest rates that I have described.
How might that be done? It seems to me there are a variety of plausible approaches, and
economists will differ on their relative efﬁcacy. Anything that stimulates demand will
operate in a positive direction from this perspective (Summers, 2014, pp. 72).
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There is some criticism that expansionary fiscal policy may not be possible because the
government cannot continue to expand its debt indefinitely. Summers responds, “As long as a
public investment yields a positive return it will generate enough revenue to service the associated
debt.” He also adds the effect will be magnified if there are any Keynesian fiscal stimulus effects
of the project or if there are any hysteresis effects. The October 2014 IMF World Economic
Outlook even suggests that public investments in countries where interest rates are near the zero
lower bound are likely to significantly reduce debt-to-GDP ratios (Summers, 2015).
Ben Bernanke, a critic of Summers’ position on secular stagnation summarizes it quite well
in an article from March 2015:
Hansen proved quite wrong, of course, failing to anticipate the postwar economic boom
(including both strong population growth—the baby boom—and rapid technological
progress). However, Summers thinks that Hansen’s prediction was not wrong, just
premature. For a number of reasons—including the contemporary decline in population
growth, the reduced capital intensity of our leading industries (think Facebook versus steelmaking), and the falling relative prices of capital goods—Larry sees Hansen’s prediction
of limited investment in new capital goods and an economy that chronically fails to reach
full employment as relevant today. If the returns to capital today are very low, then the real
interest rate needed to achieve full employment (the equilibrium real interest rate) will
likely also be very low, possibly negative. The recent pattern of slow economic growth,
low inflation, and low real interest rates motivates and is consistent with the secular
stagnation hypothesis.
Notice, by the way, that the secular stagnation story is about inadequate aggregate demand,
not aggregate supply. Even if the economy’s potential output is growing, the HansenSummers hypothesis holds that depressed investment and consumption spending will
prevent the economy from reaching that potential, except perhaps when a financial bubble
(like the housing bubble of the 2000s) provides an additional push to spending. However,
Summers argues that secular stagnation will ultimately reduce aggregate supply as well, as
growth in the economy’s productive capacity is restrained by slow rates of capital
formation and by the loss of workers’ skills caused by long-term unemployment (Bernanke,
2015).
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Bernanke’s Response to Summers
The main opponent of Lawrence Summers on the topic of secular stagnation was Ben
Bernanke. The two economists exchanged ideas back forth through a series of blog posts.
Bernanke had doubts if secular stagnation is actually taking place and what the proper solutions
are if we are experiencing it.
Bernanke denies that the United States currently faces secular stagnation for a few different
reasons, which goes beyond the fact that the U.S. economy is on its way to full employment. First,
he states that if real interest rates are consistently as low as negative 2 percent it is hard to believe
that there would be a permanent lack of profitable investment opportunities. As Paul Samuelson
once taught him, if real interest rates were expected to be negative indefinitely, almost any
investment is profitable. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that the real rate can be negative for an
extended period.
Second, Bernanke agrees with another recent critique of secular stagnation by Jim
Hamilton, Ethan Harris, Jan Hatzius, and Kenneth West. They have reservations with Summers’
claim that we have not experienced full employment during the past several decades without the
presence of a financial bubble. They reveal that the bubble in tech stocks came very late in the
boom of the 1990s, and they also provide estimates to show the positive effects of the housing
bubble of the 2000s on consumer demand were largely offset by other special factors, including
the negative effects of the dramatic increase in world oil prices and the drain on demand created
by a trade deficit equal to six percent of U.S. output. The economists argue that the slow economic
growth and higher unemployment is not likely due to secular stagnation. Rather, it is due to
temporary “headwinds” that are already in the process of dissipating. Bernanke, during his time
as Fed chairman frequently spoke of these “headwinds” arising from the aftermath of the financial
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crisis on credit conditions. The slow recovery of housing and restrictive fiscal policies at both the
federal, state, and local levels also played a part.
Finally, Bernanke’s biggest gripe with Summers’ analysis is the lack of attention to the
international dimension. Summers mostly focuses on factors affecting domestic capital investment
and household spending. Bernanke, however, has said that all else equal, the availability of
profitable capital investments throughout the rest of the world should help defeat secular stagnation
back in the United States. Bernanke explains, “The foreign exchange value of the dollar is one
channel through which this could work: If U.S. households and firms invest abroad, the resulting
outflows of financial capital would be expected to weaken the dollar, which in turn would promote
U.S. exports.” The increased exports would then raise production and employment in the United
States, helping the economy reach full employment. Therefore, in an open economy, secular
stagnation requires that returns to capital investment must be permanently low everywhere, not
just in the home economy (Bernanke, 2015).
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A Failed Growth Economy
Economist Kent Kritgaard has a different take on the secular stagnation debate. He
believes that the growth-dominated view of economies is failing us.

Growth-dominated

economies, including the United States, have three sets of limits. First, the internal limits are found
in the dynamics of capital accumulation, specifically referring to investment. When these limits
are reached, the economy will stagnate, either cyclically or long-term. The second sets of limits
are biophysical in nature. The limit of peak oil and human effects on climate change. This include
mass extinction, acidification of the oceans, and the increasing ecological footprint across the
board. Lastly, we have the limits of the political process. Post World War II brought on a growth
coalition, whose political agenda required more and more economic growth to acquire more for
their constituents. As the capacity of growth lessens so does one’s ability to grow out of social
dilemmas. (Kritgaard, 2010)
Kritgaard goes after mainstream Neoclassical and Keynesian views by explaining that they
are unable to understand their own limits. He states, “neither the neoclassical nor Keynesian
varieties of mainstream economics are capable of analyzing adequately the historical conjecture
off the internal and biophysical limits. Instead, he says to look to ecological economics and
understand that the mainstream view of growth held by both Lawrence Summers and Ben
Bernanke is incorrect. He summarizes:
The time is coming when we must begin to transcend the mere critique of mainstream
economics, and concentrate on building anew. The fundamental dilemma of the failed
growth economy: that growth is simultaneously too fast and too slow, cannot be addressed
adequately in the context of a set of institutional arrangements that rely on economic
growth to meet basic human needs of employment and freedom from poverty. We must
find theories that are consistent with the basic laws of science and do not sacrifice human
dignity to a failed system in which a reduction in economic growth translates into
stagnation and unemployment. One can find a hope for a sustainable future only in
degrowth economics (Kritgaard, 2010)
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Kritgaard states that the idea that a material economy could continue to grow forever in a
finite and non-growing biophysical environment is “absurd”. He calls on a new set of theories to
account for the rapidly approaching biophysical constraints since the mainstream theories lack this
ability.
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Chapter Eight: Concluding Remarks
The idea of a stagnant economy has been with us for centuries. It started with the followers
of Adam Smith in the Classical school. The theories were developed from Thomas Malthus’
theory on population by John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo. The Malthusian theory of population
explained that food supply would be unable to keep up with population growth in the long-term.
Both Mill and Ricardo also thought the Law of Diminishing Returns would also lead to stagnation.
This law says that that as additional amounts of capital and labor are added to production past its
optimum point, profits will continue to decrease until profit essentially falls to zero. Ricardo also
believed that without improved technology, the economy would stagnate. However, he also
argued that increased technology will only prevent stagnation for a brief period of time. Lastly,
Ricardo thought the discrepancy between fixed and circulating capital also led to stagnant society.
Next, Karl Marx developed his own view on a stagnating economy. Marx had a very
pessimistic view of capitalism. Marx and his followers believed the economy would eventually
stagnate and create misery among most people. Stagnation would occur due to the falling rate of
profit which Marx describes in great detail. The theory says that with each addition of capital to
the constant capital, there will be a reduction in the amount of variable capital. The capitalist
derives his profits from the exploitation of the laborer. An increased capital investment in
machinery would lead to the fall of profits and eventually to stagnation because of the loss of
surplus-value.
Thorstein Veblen had a very pessimistic outlook on capitalistic society also. Stagnation,
according to Veblen would arise due to the business cycle and the perfection of competition.
Additionally, nationalism and the status system would play a role in a stagnation economy. Veblen
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maintained that stagnation would be the result of a ‘conscientious withdrawal of productive
efficiency’ in a machine civilization. He predicted society will end in militaristic state as a result
of stagnation or, there will be a more equitable distribution of goods.
John Maynard Keynes’ work in the General Theory led to further theories developed on
stagnation. But, Keynes left us with some of his own thoughts on the topic. Society would be
driven into stagnation by the discrepancy in the propensity to consume and the propensity to save.
Also, the relationship of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest revealed
government manipulation of interest rates may postpone stagnation for some time. However, as
the marginal efficiency of capital tends to fall to zero, this will lead to capitalistic society into
stagnation.
Alvin Hansen developed the concept of secular stagnation and the matured economy. The
matured economy occurs due to a declining rate in population, the disappearance of new frontiers,
and the lack of new industries that will create jobs and investment opportunities. Hansen admitted
to not having concrete solutions to stagnation but his view on the result of stagnation was more
positive than previous economists before him.

He believed that action can be taken by

government, such as lowering taxes on workers and public investments to lessen the negative
impacts of stagnation.
Finally, Lawrence Summers has recently revived Hansen’s theory due to current economic
conditions here in the United States and in other industrialized countries. Summers points to the
slow economic growth and higher unemployment rates despite record low interest rates as
evidence of a stagnating economy.
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Most economists tend to disagree with the idea that secular stagnation is happening now
because we have been here before. Hansen predicted that economy would be in stagnation
permanently back in the 1930s into the 1940s. Those fears were revived briefly in the 1970s when
stagflation was taking place in the United States. But, just as it did after the Great Depression, the
economy recovered. So, there is no reason to believe that the economy won’t bounce back like it
always has.
A study of the various theories on stagnation and current conditions reveals that there is a
chance we will face secular stagnation in the years to come. As Summers believes, Hansen’s
theory has not been proven wrong, it has just been put on hold. The baby boom after World War
II only delayed secular stagnation. The declining rate of population and the lack of capital
investment is observable in today’s world. Weak economic growth has been the norm for decades.
If secular stagnation is taking place, each school of economics in which we analyzed sees
different outcomes. Marx sees the overthrow of capitalism as the next step. Veblen predicted a
militaristic state. Keynesians, such as Hansen say that stimulative policies can be enacted to
combat stagnation but may not be permanent. Lawrence Summers and Ben Bernanke, both New
Keynesians mostly believe there are remedies to the problem. Kent Kritgaard says we need a
whole new approach to the idea of growth as he rejects the mainstream views that growth in infinite
even in a finite biophysical environment.
The prospect that secular stagnation has set in has enormous consequences. Society must
adapt to a world of little to no growth. There is not unlimited growth in this case, as many
economists believe. The market cannot correct such a situation. I would suggest to economists to
think outside of their normal economic theory and analyze other heterodox views. Heterodox
views, such as Marxian, Institutionalist, Ecological, and Post-Keynesian may provide greater
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insight into this phenomenon than the Neoclassical and New Keynesian mainstream schools.
Those schools are limited in scope because of the limitations of their theory. Their theory requires
many assumptions, such as consumer rationality, perfect competition, and flexible prices and
wages that just cannot be replicated in this type of economy. The mainstream views of economic
growth may not be possible forever.
It would be wonderful to be able to say that the United States economy along with other
industrialized nations such as Japan and Germany will experience strong growth and reach full
employment. However, conditions may be falling in place where stagnation finally sets it. The
prevailing low rates of interest seem to be ineffective and it’s virtually impossible for them to go
any lower. Alvin Hansen’s theory seems to have merit to it once again and other early economists
seemed to be ahead of their time as well. We cannot ignore the possibility of a stationary state.
Instead, we must learn to adapt or change the path we are on. This begins by breaking away from
mainstream economic thinking and exploring all avenues for explanation. Secular stagnation may
already be a reality.
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